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Semi-presidentialism – where the constitution provides for both a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime
minister and cabinet collectively responsible to the legislature – is an increasingly common form of government. For
many observers cohabitation is the Achilles heel of semi-presidentialism. This article aims to identify the conditions
that are associated with the onset of cohabitation.We specify a number of hypotheses that predict the conditions under
which cohabitation should occur.We then test our hypotheses on the basis of a new data set that records every case
of cohabitation in all semi-presidential electoral democracies from 1989 to 2008 inclusive.We confirm that cohabi-
tation is more likely to occur in countries with a premier-presidential form of semi-presidentialism and show that it
is more likely to follow an election that occurs midway through a parliamentary or presidential term, and that when
cohabitation follows a presidential election, it is likely to do so in a country where there is only a very weak president.
Overall,we find that the conditions under which cohabitation is most likely to occur are also the ones where it is most
easily managed. Thus, our findings imply that cohabitation is not likely to be as problematic as the existing literature
would suggest.
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Semi-presidentialism –where the constitution provides for both a directly elected fixed-term
president and a prime minister and cabinet collectively responsible to the legislature – is an
increasingly common form of government. Particularly since the fourth wave of democra-
tisation in 1990,many countries, notably in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union and sub-SaharanAfrica,have adopted a semi-presidential constitution (Elgie,2007b).
One of the most recognisable features of semi-presidentialism is cohabitation – where there
is a president from one party and a prime minister from an opposing party and where the
president’s party is not represented in the cabinet. This term was first used to describe the
situation inFrance from1986 to1988when the socialist president,FrançoisMitterrand,shared
power with a right-wing government led by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac.Since this time,
many semi-presidential countries have experienced cohabitation.Indeed,for some countries,
such as Mongolia, Poland and Portugal, cohabitation has now become a common feature of
the political process.
For many observers cohabitation is the Achilles heel of semi-presidentialism.When the
president and the prime minister, via the assembly, can both claim to be the legitimate
source of political authority, then in young democracies the scene is set either for deadlock
between the two camps, perhaps encouraging the military to intervene to break the
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stalemate, or for either the president or the prime minister to seize power unilaterally. Linda
Kirschke (2007) has provided evidence to suggest that cohabitation has indeed been
damaging to democracy in sub-Saharan African countries. Indeed, in Niger what might be
called a ‘textbook’ case of cohabitation coincided with the collapse of democracy in 1995
(Villalón and Idrissa, 2005). In consolidated democracies, cohabitation does not pose a
threat to the democratic system, but it can cause tensions within the executive. In France,
the constitution was amended in 2000 to decrease the likelihood of cohabitation in the
future. In short, whether or not cohabitation is ultimately destructive of democracy, it
certainly poses problems of coordination within any executive. Therefore, understanding
the conditions under which cohabitation is most likely to occur is an important political
issue.
To date, there have been scarcely any systematic cross-national studies of cohabitation.
Certainly, in individual cases there has been plenty of analysis, perhaps most notably in
France where the topic has been studied in considerable detail, though predominantly by
constitutional lawyers (e.g. Cohendet, 1993). There are also plenty of case studies that refer
to the consequences of cohabitation as part of a more general narrative about the devel-
opment of the political system.1 However, the only truly cross-national comparison to date
can be found in Samuels and Shugart (2010). As part of a broader project on presidents,
prime ministers and parties, they provide descriptive statistics showing that cohabitation is
much more prevalent in countries with the premier-presidential subtype of semi-
presidentialism than in those with the president-parliamentary subtype (Samuels and
Shugart, 2010, ch. 2). That said,while David Samuels and Matthew Shugart clearly identify
the general institutional framework in which cohabitation is most likely to occur, they do
not explore the more specific conditions under which it is found. As a result, there are
plenty of questions that remain unanswered.Within a given regime type, is cohabitation
merely the stochastic result of exogenous political factors such as the party system, or is it
endogenous to particular institutional arrangements, such as the electoral timetable?What
is the relationship between presidential power and the frequency of cohabitation? In this
article, we are not concerned with the duration of cohabitation. Instead, we aim to identify
the conditions that are most likely to be associated with the onset of cohabitation. First, we
identify necessary, or virtually necessary, conditions for cohabitation. Then, we propose
some probabilistic hypotheses about the conditions under which cohabitation is more
likely.We test our hypotheses on the basis of a new data set that records every case of
cohabitation in all semi-presidential electoral democracies from 1989 to 2008 inclusive.Our
analysis is a combination of descriptive statistics and logistic regression. We find that
cohabitation is strongly associated with particular types of electoral situation.We also find
that the onset of cohabitation is often associated with the interaction of certain types of
electoral situation and the degree of presidential power in a country.
Our findings have policy implications.We show that cohabitation can generally be avoided
with the adoption of certain constitutional rules.We also find that the conditions underwhich
cohabitation is most likely to occur are also the ones where it is most easily managed. Thus,
even though we do not study the effects of cohabitation directly,our findings strongly imply
that cohabitation is not likely to be as problematic as the existing literature would suggest.
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Semi-presidentialism and Cohabitation
The definition of semi-presidentialism has long been a source of debate. In this article, we
use the definition that is now standard (Elgie, 1999; 2007a; Samuels and Shugart, 2010;
Shugart, 2005; Skach, 2005). A country has a semi-presidential constitution when there is
both a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet collectively
responsible to the legislature. The key point to note about this definition is that there is no
requirement for the president to have ‘quite considerable powers’ (Duverger, 1980, p. 166).
In other words, there is no behavioural element to it. The advantage of such a definition
is that, when deciding which countries are semi-presidential, we do not have to make a
subjective judgement call as to what constitutes ‘quite considerable powers’.We simply need
to read the constitution.
Whatever definition we use, semi-presidentialism is inextricably linked with the notion of
cohabitation. Cohabitation is more than the situation where representatives from different
parties hold the two main positions within the executive. For example, cohabitation is not
where one coalition party holds the presidency and another coalition party holds the
premiership. Instead, cohabitation is the situation where a president from one party holds
power at the same time as a prime minister from an opposing party and where the
president’s party is not represented in the cabinet. Given that there are two sources of
legitimacy under semi-presidentialism – the presidential election and the parliamentary
election – there is always the potential that one political force may win one election and
that an opposing force may win the other. Thus, the potential for cohabitation is always
present under semi-presidentialism. For this reason, debates about the pros and cons of
semi-presidentialism always involve at least some discussion of the effects of cohabitation.
The most common argument in favour of semi-presidentialism is that it can allow for a
degree of power sharing between opposing forces (Moestrup, 2007).One party can occupy
the presidency, another can occupy the premiership and, thereby, both can have a stake in
the institutional system. In their work, Samuels and Shugart (2010) provide a variant of this
argument. They state (p. 337): ‘the most important potential advantage [of the premier-
presidential subtype of semi-presidentialism] is the prospect of cohabitation,which does not
necessarily offer parties the“best of both worlds”but at least offers the possibility to oscillate
between the presidential and parliamentary worlds ’. For Samuels and Shugart therefore the
institutional flexibility of semi-presidentialism is an advantage. This flexibility expresses
itself through the potential for a shift from a unified executive to cohabitation. To use their
terms (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 338), the ‘parliamentarisation’ of the system under
cohabitation can act as a counterweight to the presidency.
The strength of Samuels and Shugart’s argument lies in the fact that it results from a
rigorous empirical study. However, they are almost a lone voice in their support of
cohabitation. The standard wisdom is that cohabitation is problematic. For example,Alfred
Stepan and Ezra Suleiman (1995, p. 399) see ‘the possibility of constitutional conflict
between two electorally legitimated executives [as] the central problem [of semi-
presidentialism]’. Sergio Fabbrini (1995, p. 133) states that ‘[h]erein lies the main weakness
of semipresidentialism: the possibility of a rift between the president with his popular
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majority and the premier with his legislative majority. Such a split could hamper or even
paralyze the executive’. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996, p. 286) are more explicit still:
When supporters of one or the other component of semi-presidentialism feel that the country
would be better off if one branch of the democratically legitimated structure of rule would
disappear or be closed, the democratic system is endangered and suffers an overall loss of
legitimacy, since those questioning one or the other will tend to consider the political system
undesirable as long as the side they favor does not prevail ... [I]n a semipresidential system,
policy conflicts often express themselves as a conflict between two branches of democracy.
For these writers cohabitation can be harmful for the very survival of democracy.However,
in consolidated democracies too cohabitation is often a source of dissatisfaction. This is seen
most clearly in France. The first experience of cohabitation from 1986 to 1988 ‘did not
produce a fundamental political or constitutional crisis’, but it did produce ‘severe strains
between the president and the prime minister’ (Pierce, 1991, p. 287). President Mitterrand
refused to sign certain government decrees; he returned a number of government bills to
parliament for further consideration; and the prime minister encroached upon the presi-
dent’s ‘reserved domain’ of foreign and defence policy. The third period of cohabitation
from 1997 to 2002,which began just two years into President Chirac’s seven-year term,was
even more ‘devastating’ (Quermonne, 2007, p. 6) in that it ‘progressively slowed down the
government’s work and placed France’s external relations in a difficult position, as wit-
nessed in European affairs by the unfortunate Treaty of Nice’.2 The political response was
the introduction of the five-year presidential term in 2000 and the de facto synchronisation
of presidential and legislative elections. For those in favour of this constitutional reform, the
desire to avoid cohabitation was the ‘main benefit’ (Bigaut, 2000, p. 11) that would accrue
from it.
To summarise, cohabitation has been the source of considerable academic and political
debate. To date, this work has overwhelmingly focused on the effects of cohabitation. It has
shown that cohabitation can have important positive or, more usually, negative conse-
quences. In short, it has been shown that cohabitation matters. In this article, we have a
different aim.We wish to identify the conditions under which cohabitation is most likely
to occur. Specifically, with what types of condition is cohabitation most likely to be
associated? If we can identify regularities in the onset of cohabitation, then we can place the
debate about the effects of cohabitation – good or bad – in its appropriate institutional
context.
Cohabitation in Semi-presidential Electoral Democracies
We define cohabitation as the situation where a president from one party holds power at
the same time as a prime minister from an opposing party and where the president’s party
is not represented in the cabinet.Whatever the party composition of the cabinet, if either
the president or the prime minister is non-partisan or independent, then we do not class this
as a case of cohabitation. To determine the party identification of the president and prime
minister, we rely on the affiliations recorded in www.worldstatesmen.org. This is a reliable
source and it standardises such affiliations as far as possible. To determine the party
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composition of cabinets, we use secondary sources, including publications such as Africa
Research Bulletin and the European Journal of Political Research Political DataYearbook.
We identify every occurrence of cohabitation in all countries with a semi-presidential
constitution that are recorded as electoral democracies by Freedom House to 2008 inclu-
sive. Their time series for electoral democracies goes back to 1989 inclusive.3 While we
could have increased our units of observation by using data sets with longer time series, for
example, Freedom House’s Freedom in theWorld democracy scores or Polity IV scores,we
rely on the electoral democracy classification partly because the time series is long enough
to capture the increase in the number of semi-presidential countries after 1990 and also
because we do not have to impose a cut-off point as to what score constitutes the threshold
above which a country can be classed as a democracy. For the purposes of this study,
therefore, if a country with a semi-presidential constitution is classed as an electoral
democracy, then we include it in our data set. If such a country is first classified as an
electoral democracy some time after 1989,we record it only from the year when it achieved
this status. If a country loses the status of an electoral democracy, then we cease to include
it in our data set. However, if the same country is reclassified as an electoral democracy at
a later date, then we record it in our data set from that year on.
In our data set, the basic unit of observation is an electoral period. This comprises the time
between a presidential or parliamentary election. Each unit of observation is a potential
period of cohabitation.We are not concerned with the duration of cohabitation, only with
whether or not cohabitation occurs in the first place. Therefore, we treat each electoral
period,whatever its length, as one unit of observation. For example, Lithuania is first classed
as an electoral democracy in 1991. However, it adopted a semi-presidential constitution in
September 1992. The observations begin with the first direct presidential election in
February 1993. There was then a parliamentary election in October/November 1996, a
presidential election in December 1997/January 1998, a parliamentary election in October
2000, a presidential election in December 2002/January 2003, another presidential election
in June 2004 following the impeachment of President Rolandas Paksas, a parliamentary
election in October 2004, and a further parliamentary election in October 2008. This gives
us eight units of observation for Lithuania (1993-1996, 1996-1998, 1998-2000, 2000-2003,
2003-2004, 2004, 2004-2008, and 2008-). There are two periods of cohabitation. The first
was from 1996-1998 when President Algirdas Brazauskas from the Democratic Labour
Party of Lithuania was faced with Prime Minister GediminasVagnorius from the Homeland
Union-Conservatives of Lithuania who headed a three-party coalition in which the
president’s party was not represented. The second was from 2003-2004 when President
Rolandas Paksas from the Liberal Democratic Party was opposite Prime Minister Algirdas
Brazauskas who then represented the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania and who also
headed a coalition in which the president’s party was not represented. In the other seven
units of observation for Lithuania either the president was classed as non-partisan or the
president’s party was represented in the government. In all, we have 218 units of observa-
tion, including 43 units, or periods, of cohabitation.4 Table 1 lists the countries that are
included in the study, the periods when they have been classed as electoral democracies and
whether they have a president-parliamentary or premier-presidential subtype of semi-
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Table 1: Semi-presidential Electoral Democracies, 1989–2008 Inclusive
Country Years included in data set Subtype of semi-presidentialism
Armenia 1999–2002 President-parliamentary
Austria 1989– President-parliamentary
Bulgaria 1992– Premier-presidential
Cape Verde 1991– Premier-presidential
Central African Rep. 1991–2000, 2005–7 President-parliamentary
Congo-Brazzaville 1992–6 Premier-presidential
Croatia 1991– President-parliamentary (to 2000)
Premier-presidential (from 2001)
Finland 1989– Premier-presidential
France 1989– Premier-presidential
Guinea-Bissau 1994–2002, 2005– President-parliamentary
Haiti 1995–9, 2006– Premier-presidential
Iceland 1989– President-parliamentary
Ireland 1989– Premier-presidential
Lithuania 1993– Premier-presidential
Macedonia 1992– Premier-presidential
Madagascar 1993– Premier-presidential (to 1995)
President-parliamentary (from 1996)
Mali 1992– Premier-presidential
Mauritania 2007–8 President-parliamentary
Moldova 1995–2000 Premier-presidential
Mongolia 1992– Premier-presidential
Montenegro 2006– Premier-presidential
Mozambique 1994– President-parliamentary
Namibia 1990– President-parliamentary
Niger 1993–6, 1999– Premier-presidential
Peru 1989–91, 2001– President-parliamentary
Poland 1991– Premier-presidential
Portugal 1989– Premier-presidential
Romania 1992– Premier-presidential
Russia 1993–2003 President-parliamentary
São Tomé e Príncipe 1991– President-parliamentary (to 2002)
Premier-presidential (from 2003)
Senegal 2000– President-parliamentary
Serbia 2006– Premier-presidential
Slovakia 1999– Premier-presidential
Slovenia 1992– Premier-presidential
Sri Lanka 1989– President-parliamentary
Taiwan 1996– President-parliamentary
Timor-Leste 2002– Premier-presidential
Turkey 2007– Premier-presidential
Ukraine 1994– President-parliamentary (to 2006)
Premier-presidential (from 2007)
Source for electoral democracies: Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 [accessed 9 February 2010].
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presidentialism (see H5 below). Table 2 lists the periods of cohabitation in these countries.
Table 3 lists periods of non-partisan presidencies in these countries. There are 44 units of
observation with non-partisan presidents.We present relevant descriptive statistics hypoth-
esis by hypothesis.
Explaining the Onset of Cohabitation
Under what Conditions is Cohabitation Likely to Occur?
The first condition is the absence of a majority for the president’s party in the legislature.
While we would hesitate to raise this or any condition to that of a true ‘sociological law’,
we can certainly treat it as a de facto necessary condition for cohabitation. By definition,
under semi-presidentialism the government is responsible to the legislature. If the president
is partisan and if the president’s party has a majority in the legislature, then it is difficult to
imagine the circumstances under which the president’s party would not be represented in
the government. Any attempt to install a government without the president’s party would
result in it being voted out of office by the presidential majority. So cohabitation will,
inevitably, be associated with situations where the president’s party fails to enjoy the support
of an absolute majority in the legislature.
H1. Cohabitation will occur when the president’s party has less than 50 per cent of the seats
in the legislature.
Table 2: Periods of Cohabitation in Semi-presidential
Electoral Democracies, 1989–2008 Inclusive
Country Period of cohabitation to end 2008
Austria 2004–7
Bulgaria 1995–7, 2001–2, 2002–5
Finland 1991–4, 1994–5, 2007–
France 1993–5, 1997–2002
Iceland 1996–9, 1999–2000, 2000–3, 2003–4, 2004–7
Ireland 1990–2, 1997
Lithuania 1996–8, 2003–4
Macedonia 2002–4, 2006–8, 2008–
Mongolia 1993–6, 1997–2000
Niger 1995–6
Poland 1991–3, 1993–5, 1997–2000, 2000–1, 2007–
Portugal 1987–91, 1991, 1991–5, 2002–5, 2006–
Romania 2007–8
São Tomé 1994–6, 1996–9, 1999–2001, 2004–5
Serbia 2006–7
Slovakia 2004–6
Slovenia 2004–6
Sri Lanka 2001–4
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Unsurprisingly, the empirical evidence supports this hypothesis.We calculated the percent-
age of seats held by the president’s party in each of the units of observation and we found
that all of the periods of cohabitation occurred when the president’s party failed to enjoy
majority support in the legislature. For example, in Portugal the Socialist party won the
parliamentary election in February 2005, returning 52.6 per cent of the total number of
deputies to the legislature and forming a single-party government. At the time, the
incumbent president was Jorge Sampaio, also representing the Socialist party. So there was
no cohabitation. However, in January 2006 Aníbal Cavaco Silva, representing the centre-
right Social Democratic party,won the presidential election. The Social Democrats enjoyed
the support of 32.6 per cent of deputies in the legislature that had been elected the previous
year.With the Socialists still enjoying an absolute majority there, the government did not
change and a period of cohabitation began. This example clearly shows that the onset of
cohabitation was associated with the shift from a situation where the president’s party
enjoyed majority support in the legislature to one where the president’s party was in a
minority.
While cohabitation is almost inconceivable in situations where the president’s party enjoys
majority support in the legislature, such an outcome is relatively uncommon. In fact, in our
data set the president’s party enjoyed the support of an absolute majority in the legislature
in only 40 of 218 observations (18.3 per cent) in total and in 40 of the 175 observations
(22.9 per cent) that remain when we exclude the observations where the president was
non-partisan, and where, by definition, the president’s party could not enjoy majority
support. Therefore, while the absence of an absolute majority for the president’s party in
Table 3: Units of Non-partisan Presidencies in Semi-presidential Electoral Democracies,
1989–2008 Inclusive
Country Non-partisan presidents to end 2008
Armenia 1999–2002 (president-parliamentary)
Central African Rep. 2005–7 (president-parliamentary)
Croatia 2000–3, 2003–5, 2005–7, 2007– (premier-presidential)
Iceland 1988–91, 1991–2, 1992–5, 1995–6 (president-parliamentary)
Lithuania 1998–2000, 2000–3, 2004, 2004–8 (premier-presidential)
Macedonia 1992–4, 1994–8, 1998–9 (premier-presidential)
Mali 2002–7, 2007– (premier-presidential)
Mauritania 2007 (president–parliamentary)
Moldova 1995–6, 1996–8, 1998–2000 (premier-presidential)
Russia 1993–5, 1995–6, 1996–9, 1999–2000, 2000–3 (president-parliamentary)
São Tomé 1991–4, 1994–6 (president-parliamentary)
Slovakia 2006– (premier-presidential)
Slovenia 1992–6, 1996–7, 1997–2000, 2000–2, 2006–7 (premier-presidential)
Timor-Leste 2002–7, 2007– (premier–presidential)
Ukraine 1994–8, 1998–9, 1999–2002, 2002–4 (president-parliamentary)
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the legislature is a necessary condition for cohabitation, we still need to identify the
circumstances in which cohabitation occurs when the president’s party does not enjoy
majority support there.
In this context, we begin by noting that cohabitation can occur as a result of three types of
electoral situation:when synchronised presidential and legislative elections return opposing
majorities; when a presidential election returns a candidate who is in opposition to the
incumbent legislative majority (as in the previously cited Portuguese example); and when
a legislative election returns a majority that is opposed to the incumbent president (as
happened in France in 1986, 1993 and 1997). The only other situation under which we
would observe cohabitation is if it were to occur midway through an electoral period.We
hypothesise that this latter scenario is highly unlikely. Cohabitation could occur if the
president’s party were to withdraw unilaterally from the government. However, all else
being equal, the president’s party is unlikely to do so because it would leave the president
totally alone within the executive. Cohabitation could also occur if the incumbent gov-
ernment was voted down by the legislature and a new government was formed that
excluded the president’s party.However, if the legislature were to vote down a government
that included the president’s party, it is likely that the president would still be able to avoid
cohabitation. By virtue of his or her popular legitimacy, the president may be in a position
to insist on his or her party being included in the new government, or to require a
non-party technical government. Alternatively, the president may decide to dissolve the
legislature rather than accept an unexpected period of cohabitation and potential loss of
influence. So while cohabitation can occur outside an electoral context, it is very unlikely
to do so.
H2. Cohabitation only occurs after elections.
Our data set strongly supports this hypothesis. Only two of the 43 cases of cohabitation
began midway through an electoral period: in Romania from April 2007 until the election
of December 2008 and in SãoTomé e Príncipe from March 2004 until the president’s party
rejoined the government in June 2005.5 The Romanian case illustrates the exceptional
circumstances that need to combine to lead to cohabitation occurring outside an electoral
context. Following the 2004 legislative election, President Ba˘sescu’s Democratic Liberal
party (PD-L) was part of the governing coalition led by Prime Minister Popescu-Ta˘riceanu
of the National Liberal party (PNL) that included the PNL, the PD-L and two other
parties. However, relations between the president and prime minister deteriorated so much
that in April 2007 Prime Minister Popescu-Ta˘riceanu proposed a cabinet reshuffle that
excluded the PD-L ministers from the new government (Stan and Zaharia, 2008, p. 1120).
A couple of weeks later, parliament voted to impeach President Ba˘sescu, accusing him of
authoritarianism. In May a referendum was held to validate the impeachment vote. Turnout
was relatively low, but the vote was overturned. Both the president and the government
remained in office and cohabitation continued until the legislative election in December
2008, but the fact that the onset of cohabitation midway through an electoral period
coincided with parliament voting to impeach a president and a referendum on the
president’s survival in office shows that this scenario is likely to be associated with only an
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exceptional political situation. Overall, our findings provide overwhelming support for the
proposition that cohabitation is likely to follow an election.6
Given that cohabitation is highly unlikely to occur outside an electoral context, the
question arises as to whether particular types of election are more or less likely to lead to
cohabitation. In this regard,we can hypothesise that cohabitation is unlikely to occur when
presidential and parliamentary elections are synchronised. For cohabitation to occur under
such conditions, there would have to be considerable split-ticket voting.While presidential
elections are necessarily majoritarian, the legislative election would have to return a
coherent majority that was actively opposed to the president. This is possible, but unlikely.
As noted previously, in France the length of the president’s mandate was changed delib-
erately to minimise the future likelihood of cohabitation. By contrast, in 2003 the presi-
dent’s term in Romania was increased from four to five years. Previously, presidential and
parliamentary elections had been held simultaneously with the former acting as a ‘trail-
blazer’ in terms of government selection (Ta˘na˘sescu, 2008, p. 69). By ‘desynchronising’ the
elections, the 2003 reform was not designed specifically to encourage cohabitation, but it
was passed with a view to reducing the pre-eminence of the president in the political
process, which is consistent with the general effect of cohabitation.
H3. Cohabitation will not occur when presidential and legislative elections are synchronised.
Again, descriptive statistics are sufficient to provide strong support for this hypothesis. In 50
of our 218 observations (22.9 per cent) presidential and legislative elections were held
within three months of each other. For example, in Mozambique, Namibia and Romania
(until 2008) the constitution specified simultaneous elections. In other countries, simulta-
neous (or quasi-simultaneous) elections were simply a function of the electoral timetable,
as with the above case of Slovenia in 1992.However, none of these 50 observations resulted
in cohabitation. In other words, the evidence strongly suggests that cohabitation is over-
whelmingly likely to occur after a ‘mid-term’ election, that is to say following a legislative
election that occurs at some point during a president’s term or following a presidential
election that occurs at some point during a legislature’s term.
We have already shown that cohabitation is unlikely ever to be associated with the situation
where the president’s party enjoys an absolute majority in the legislature.By the same logic,
even when the president’s party does not enjoy majority support, we would expect
cohabitation to be less likely when the president’s party has more support in the legislature
than when the president’s party is only a small force. True, if there was a two-party system,
then the president’s party could win a very large minority of seats in the legislature and
cohabitation could still occur because the opposition would have a majority. However, all
else being equal, if the president’s party has a very large minority of seats, then it is highly
likely that the president’s party will be an indispensable part of the coalition-building
process, thus ensuring that cohabitation is avoided.By contrast, if the president heads a party
with little support in the legislature, then, even though the president may have considerable
personal legitimacy by virtue of being directly elected, the parliamentary arithmetic may
mean that the president’s party is not required for the construction of a stable legislative
majority.
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H4. When the president’s party does not have majority support in the legislature, cohabitation
is less likely to occur as the share of the seats held by the president’s party increases.
To test this hypothesis, we perform a logistic regression of cohabitation as predicted by the
share of the seats held by the president’s party in the legislature when the seat share is 50
per cent or less. The sample also excludes non-partisan presidents. The mean presidential
share was almost 31 per cent, with a standard deviation of 13, a minimum of zero and a
maximum, by construction, of 50. Unsurprisingly, as Table 4 shows, we find that this
variable is quite powerful, explaining over 11 per cent of the variation in this sample. The
presidential share has an obvious substantive importance. For example, the model predicts
that if the seat share of the president’s party in the legislature were to fall from 30 to 20 per
cent the probability of cohabitation would rise from 0.29 to 0.44, an increase of over 50 per
cent. In all subsequent models, we restrict the sample to cases where the president’s party
did not enjoy more than 50 per cent of the seats in the legislature.
In their recent book, Samuels and Shugart (2010) have shown that cohabitation is more
likely to be associated with the premier-presidential subtype of semi-presidentialism than
with the president-parliamentary subtype. The difference between the two subtypes is
constitutional: under president-parliamentarism the president has the power unilaterally to
dismiss the prime minister, whereas under premier-presidentialism this power is absent.
Samuels and Shugart (2010, ch. 2) argue that parties are more likely to be presidentialised
under the president-parliamentary subtype due to the importance that is placed on winning
the presidency. Given that presidents have greater influence over legislative parties under
this subtype (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 55), there are likely to be greater opportunities,
they argue, for presidents to avoid cohabitation than under premier-presidentialism.
Samuels and Shugart provide a ready-made hypothesis for us to test. Moreover, they also
provide us with an excellent opportunity to test the external validity of our findings. This
is because they use the same definition of semi-presidentialism and cohabitation as this
study, but they also use quite different case selection criteria when compiling their
Table 4: Logit Model of Presidential Share and Cohabitation
Model 1
Coefficient Standard error
Presidential share -0.0646 0.0194***
Constant 1.09 0.685
Wald chi2 11.13***
Pseudo R2 0.11
Observations 133
States 27
Notes: *Significant at p < 0.1; **significant at p < 0.05; ***significant at p < 0.01. Robust
standard errors clustered by state.
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cross-national data set and they calculate the incidence of cohabitation differently. They
include countries only when they have scored at least +5 on the Polity IV scale for at least
five consecutive years in the period from 1945 to 2007 inclusive (Samuels and Shugart,
2010, p. 40). Also, they identify the incidence of cohabitation on the basis of the total
percentage of years that semi-presidential democracies have experienced this situation.7 If
we can replicate their finding about the greater likelihood of cohabitation in countries with
a premier-presidential subtype of semi-presidentialism, then we can identify a further
condition under which the onset of cohabitation is likely to occur and we can also have
confidence in our findings more generally.
H5: Cohabitation is more likely in countries with a premier-presidential form of semi-
presidentialism than in those with a president-parliamentary form.
To test this hypothesis we conduct a logit of cohabitation as predicted by the subtype of
semi-presidentialism controlling for the share of the president’s party’s seats in the leg-
islature. The result (Table 5, Model 1) fails to reproduce Samuels and Shugart’s finding
that cohabitation is associated with premier-presidentialism. However, the result is driven
by the very influential outlying case of São Tomé e Príncipe, which has a president-
parliamentary form of semi-presidentialism. This small African country of 160,000
inhabitants was excluded from Samuels and Shugart’s study by Polity’s size criterion.
There were four periods of cohabitation in São Tomé e Príncipe between 1994 and
2005. However, in our sample there was only one other case of cohabitation in a
president-parliamentary regime: Sri Lanka 2001–4. If we exclude São Tomé e Príncipe,
81 per cent of the observations are premier-presidential and the balance, of course, are
president-parliamentary. As Table 5, Model 2 shows, the coefficient for premier-
presidentialism more than doubles in size and reaches statistical significance. Holding
presidential share at the mean for this sample (30 per cent), a premier-presidential regime
has a 0.34 probability of cohabitation, while a president-parliamentary regime has a
probability of less than 0.04.
Table 5: Logit Models of Regime Type and Cohabitation
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Presidential share -0.0603 0.018*** -0.0654 0.019***
Premier-presidentialism 1.14 0.905 2.586 1.252**
Constant 0.0221 1.084 -1.287 1.185
Wald chi2 14.01*** 12.84***
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.18
Observations 133 126
States 27 26
Notes: *Significant at p < 0.1; **significant at p < 0.05; ***significant at p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by state.
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These results suggest that premier-presidentialism has a large and direct impact on the
likelihood of cohabitation. However, it is also possible that premier-presidentialism may be
associated with a lower seat share for the president’s party. Given that we have just
demonstrated that this is a necessary condition for cohabitation, premier-presidentialism’s
effect on cohabitation may be indirect, biasing our estimates of the direct effects of
premier-presidentialism. To address this possibility, we conducted a number of Heckman
probit models, which tested the effect of these two different causal channels from regime
subtype to cohabitation. In no version was there evidence that a single-equation structure
like that presented in Table 5 would bias estimates of the effect of premier-presidentialism.
Thus, we can be confident that premier-presidentialism has a direct impact on the
likelihood of cohabitation. From this point on we control for regime subtype but,when we
do so, we exclude São Tomé e Príncipe.
As we have shown, cohabitation is highly unlikely to follow a mid-term election. The
question therefore remains as to whether it is more likely to be associated with a presidential
election that occurs at some point during a legislative term or with a legislative election that
occurs at some point during a presidential term. All else being equal, we assume that
cohabitation is more likely to follow a mid-term legislative election than a mid-term
presidential election. If cohabitation follows a mid-term legislative election, then even if the
president has the power to dissolve the legislature this power is unlikely to be available
politically because an immediate dissolution would be likely merely to confirm the result
of the previous legislative election. As a result, the president will have to accept a period of
cohabitation before, in practice, the power to dissolve becomes operational. By contrast, if
cohabitation follows a mid-term presidential election, then a president who has the power
to dissolve the legislature will immediately do so in the hope of returning a pro-presidential
majority or at least avoiding a pro-opposition majority. This was the strategy adopted by
President Mitterrand in France following his election in 1981 and his re-election in 1988.
Moreover, even if the president does not have the power to dissolve the legislature,
mid-term presidential elections often provide the opportunity to reshape the party system,
breaking old alliances and encouraging new coalitions. Therefore, a newly elected president
may be able to forge a workable majority or at least avoid a hostile majority even without
a legislative election.
H6. When cohabitation follows an election, it is more likely to follow a legislative election
than a presidential election.
In order to test this hypothesis, we add a dummy variable for legislative, as opposed to
presidential, elections – 63 per cent of the observations were legislative elections and the rest
were presidential.We also control for the subtype of semi-presidentialism and for the share
of the president’s party’s seats in the legislature. The results do not support this hypothesis.
Model 4 shows that the coefficient is in the wrong direction and does not approach
significance (see Table 6). There are plausible reasons why the simple hypothesis does not
work. In semi-presidential countries, presidential elections are often held under a two-ballot
system.Under such a system, the eventual winner may be well short of a plurality at the first
ballot, but may still win a plurality at the second ballot when faced with a controversial
opponent. In such a case, the president’s party may perform only weakly at the subsequent
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legislative election and cohabitation may ensue. In addition, in some democracies presidents
may have considerable personal appeal, but they may have only a weak and ambivalent
relationship with political parties. Again, this may mean that they are popular,whereas their
party remains only a minor political force.
While these reasons may account for why the simple hypothesis fails, we focus on the
interaction between the power of the president and the type of election to explain the
likelihood or otherwise of cohabitation.One of the consequences of a purely constitutional
definition of semi-presidentialism is that the list of semi-presidential countries includes
countries with weak presidents as well as those with strong presidents.We hypothesise that
when cohabitation follows a presidential election it is more likely to do so if the president
is weak. So far, we have assumed that cohabitation matters. However, if the president is
weak, then cohabitation may not figure as a political issue at all. Parties may organise to win
the presidential election simply because they are office seeking, but policy-seeking political
competition will focus predominantly on the outcome of the legislative election. In these
cases, the presidential election is, in effect, a second-order election. Ireland is a good
example. Here, the term ‘cohabitation’ is absent from the political vocabulary, even though
there have been occasions when the president has been from a party that has not been
represented in government. In Ireland the president is a figurehead position. Very occa-
sionally the president may express a different opinion from the government, usually on
social issues (Tavits, 2009). For the most part, though, the presidency is a ceremonial office.
While presidential elections are sometimes uncontested, usually when a popular incumbent
is willing to stand again, they are the object of political competition and, on occasions, the
competition has been fierce, notably in 1990 (O’Sullivan, 1990).Whatever the intensity of
the presidential competition, the election to the lower house of the legislature is the
overwhelming focus of political activity. As a result, while cohabitation may result from a
presidential election, the outcome will be largely, if not totally, irrelevant to the decision-
making process. Thus, even if parties want to win the presidential election, there are few
Table 6: Logit Model of Election Type and Cohabitation
Model 4
Coefficient Standard error
Presidential share -0.0648 0.019***
Premier-presidentialism 2.65 1.315**
Legislative election -0.223 0.462
Constant -1.227 1.18
Wald chi2 12.5***
Pseudo R2 0.185
Observations 126
States 26
Notes: *Significant at p < 0.1; **significant at p < 0.05; ***significant at p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by state.
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costs to losing it and, hence, few costs to cohabitation. The same is not true in a country
where the president has real constitutional powers.
H7. When cohabitation follows a presidential election, it is more likely to do so when there
is a weak president.
To test this hypothesis, we measure presidential power as a continuous variable using Alan
Siaroff ’s (2003) measure, which runs from 0 to 8.8 In the sample for Table 7, Model 5, the
mean Siaroff score, is almost 3 with a standard deviation of over 2 and a range of 0 to 6.9We
first show that, while the relationship between presidential power by itself and cohabitation
is in the right direction, the coefficient is very small and statistically insignificant (see Table 7,
Model 5). We then restricted the sample to presidential elections. Since there was no
variation in cohabitation among president-parliamentary countries, with the exception of
the outlier SãoTomé, we have dropped the regime variable. The resulting analysis strongly
supports our hypothesis: the presidential power coefficient is almost ten times larger and is
now statistically significant (see Table 7, Model 6). The restriction to presidential elections
and premier-presidentialism removes over 60 per cent of the observations, but only seven of
the 26 countries. The mean in this sample is 2.5, a little lower than for Model 5. Again, the
model’s implications are substantively noteworthy. Holding presidential share at the sample
mean of 29 per cent, a regime with maximum presidential power has a 0.29 probability of
cohabitation, rising to 0.91 if the constitution scores the minimum for presidential power.
More subtle shifts are also predicted to have a profound effect on cohabitation.Reducing the
presidential power from one to two reduces the probability of cohabitation by 0.06.10
Descriptive statistics also help us to illustrate these findings. Cohabitation follows a presi-
dential election on fourteen occasions.However, we find that the country with the highest
Siaroff score that experienced cohabitation following a presidential election was pre-reform
Finland in 1994 with a score of 4.11 Generally, we find that when cohabitation followed a
presidential election it did so overwhelmingly in countries with weaker-than-average
Table 7: Logit Models of Presidential Power and Cohabitation
Model 5 Model 6
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Presidential share -0.0664 0.019*** -0.08 0.0225***
Premier-presidentialism 2.448 1.233** – –
Presidential power -0.044 0.132 -0.41 0.174**
Constant -1.018 1.285 2.295 0.95**
Wald chi2 12.75*** 14.07***
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.227
Observations 126 48
States 26 19
Notes: *Significant at p < 0.1; **significant at p < 0.05; ***significant at p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered by state.
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presidencies: Austria (adjusted Siaroff score of 0), Iceland (0), Ireland (1), Slovakia (1),
Bulgaria (2), Lithuania (3), Mongolia (3), Poland (2) and Portugal (2).
Thus, while we find no support for the simple hypothesis that cohabitation is more likely
to follow a legislative election, we find strong support for the proposition that the onset of
cohabitation is indeed at least partly determined by the type of election.When cohabitation
follows a presidential election, it is much more likely to do so in a country with a weak
presidency than in one with a strong presidency.
The Effect of Cohabitation and the Conditions under which it Occurs
There is an ongoing debate as to whether semi-presidentialism constitutes a good consti-
tutional choice. Central to this debate is the impact of cohabitation.While there is some
support for the idea that cohabitation can have positive benefits,most observers believe that
cohabitation is problematic. In this article,we have not examined the effects of cohabitation
directly. Even so, our findings add to the debate about the pros and cons of cohabitation and
to the debate about semi-presidentialism generally.
We have confirmed the finding from Samuels and Shugart (2010) concerning the effect of
regime type on the incidence of cohabitation. Countries with the president-parliamentary
subtype of semi-presidentialism are much less likely to experience cohabitation than those
with the premier-presidential subtype. This finding is not driven by the greater presence of
non-partisan presidents in the president-parliamentary countries in our data set. While
non-partisan presidents are common in such countries generally, often they are common in
countries that are not classed as electoral democracies. Therefore, these countries do not
enter our data set in the first place. Indeed, in our sample 25 of the 44 observations with
non-partisan presidents were found in premier-presidential countries (see Table 3). This
suggests that if the overwhelming aim of constitution makers is the desire to avoid
cohabitation, then semi-presidential countries should adopt a president-parliamentary form
of semi-presidentialism. That said, studies have shown that president-parliamentarism is also
much more likely to be associated with democratic collapse and with a lower quality of
government (Elgie, 2007b; Elgie and McMenamin, 2008; Samuels and Shugart, 2010;
Shugart and Carey, 1992). In this article we have shown that synchronised presidential and
legislative elections, or quasi-synchronised elections, where both elections are held within
three months of each other, are a very effective way of avoiding cohabitation even under a
premier-presidential form of semi-presidentialism. Thus, we have shown that opponents of
president-parliamentarism and cohabitation can have the best of both worlds – premier-
presidentialism plus synchronised elections makes it very unlikely that cohabitation will
occur.
Most observers believe cohabitation to be problematic.While we have not examined the
effects of cohabitation directly, our findings imply that cohabitation may be less problematic
than the received wisdom may suggest. For most scholars cohabitation is associated with
problems of executive coordination.We have not tested for the direct effect of cohabitation
in this regard, but our results provide indirect evidence for the belief that cohabitation may
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not be as problematic as the folk wisdom might suggest.We have shown that cohabitation
is very unlikely to occur outside the context of an election. Given that democracies rest on
the legitimacy of the electoral process, the fact that cohabitations overwhelmingly follow
elections suggests that cohabitation is likely to be seen as a legitimate element of that
process, albeit perhaps an unwanted one. If cohabitation is seen as legitimate, then the main
political actors – president, prime minister, legislature – are likely to work within the
framework with which they have been presented rather than undermine it. This does not
mean that there will be an unexpected outbreak of political harmony, but it does suggest
that actors will respect the boundaries of the constitutional process. The French experience
of cohabitation strongly supports this proposition. No-one among the political class was
very happy with cohabitation. Everyone wanted sole authority.However, the election result
meant that this was not possible. Therefore, while the president was willing to intervene in
a way that made the decision-making process more complex than had previously been the
case, there was no legislative gridlock. The president did not try to dismiss the prime
minister against the wishes of the majority. The majority did not refuse to propose a prime
minister or refuse to cooperate by insisting on the resignation of the president. So, even
though we have not tested for the effect of cohabitation on executive coordination, our
findings suggest that any problems of coordination will occur in a context in which the
main political actors are likely to respect the basic rules of the admittedly unusual game with
which they are faced.
Building on this point, we have also shown that potentially the most problematic scenario
in which cohabitation can occur – following a presidential election – is unlikely to be a
source of contestation. Under semi-presidentialism, as under presidentialism, a general
worry is that a president will rely on his or her personal authority and rule by decree, so
undermining the legislative majority (Skach, 2005). We might imagine that if a newly
elected president is unable to dissolve an opposition legislature and immediately faces a
period of cohabitation, then even in a consolidated democracy the incentive for the
president to act unilaterally in order to pursue his or her legitimate mandate may be
overwhelming. The result may not be the collapse of democracy, but it could be the
polarisation of the political process, leading to inefficient decision making. While the
personalisation of presidential power may well be a general problem under semi-
presidentialism, particularly under its president-parliamentary subtype, we have found that
it is unlikely to be a problem that results from cohabitation.We have shown that when
cohabitation follows a presidential election, it is likely to do so in countries where the
president is a relatively weak political actor. Indeed, we have found that it is often likely to
do so in countries where the president is so weak that the concept of cohabitation is
completely absent from the political vocabulary.
Overall, our findings suggest that the critics of cohabitation may have exaggerated its
problems.We have shown that cohabitation is likely to occur in the context where it is
easiest to manage. This does not mean that there will not be problems of executive
coordination during cohabitation. It merely means that such problems are likely to occur
in the most benign context possible. Thus, the negative impact of cohabitation may not be
as great as the received wisdom would have us believe.
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Conclusion
Semi-presidentialism is closely associated with cohabitation. For most observers, cohabita-
tion is a problem. In new democracies its effects can be so devastating that the process of
democratisation itself may collapse. In consolidated democracies, it can lead to problems of
executive coordination and legislative gridlock. In this article, we have provided the first
systematic exploration of the conditions under which cohabitation is likely to occur.
Cohabitation only occurs when the president’s party fails to enjoy majority support in the
legislature. In this context, we have confirmed that it is more likely to occur in countries
with a premier-presidential form of semi-presidentialism.We have also shown that it is more
likely to follow an election, and that it is likely to follow an election that occurs midway
through a parliamentary or presidential term.We have also shown that when cohabitation
follows a presidential election, it is likely to do so in a country where there is only a very
weak president. Together, these findings have important policy implications. If constitution
makers wish to avoid cohabitation at all costs, then we have identified a very clear strategy
that maximises the chances of doing so. However, we have also suggested that there is
perhaps less need to be concerned about cohabitation than the received wisdom would
suggest.We find that the conditions under which cohabitation is most likely to occur are
also the ones under which it is likely to be most easily managed. By itself, this finding does
not provide support for semi-presidentialism.However, it does suggest that one of the most
oft-cited problems of semi-presidentialism is less serious than the folk wisdom would
suggest.
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3 The data are available from: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439.
4 We excluded Kyrgyzstan because we were unable to calculate the effective number of parliamentary parties and because we did
not have sufficient constitutional information about the country.
5 In addition, one period of cohabitation ends mid-way through an electoral period. In Slovenia, President Janez Drnovšek officially
left the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia party in January 2006 and became non-partisan, thus ending a period of cohabitation that
began with the parliamentary election in October 2004.
6 These two cases and the Slovenian case from 2006–2007 (see note 5) lead us to a slightly different coding of our unit of
observation. For example, in the case of Romania from 2004 to 2008 there are two units, one covering the period from the
election of 2004 to the beginning of the period of cohabitation in 2007 and then one from this point until the next election in
2008. The minor measurement anomaly does not affect our results. Indeed, for many of our empirical analyses, for other reasons,
São Tomé e Príncipe has been eliminated from the models, leaving only the Romanian and Slovenian non-electoral periods.
7 Their study raises operational issues in the classification of a handful of countries.We include Iceland and São Tomé, neither of
which are part of the Polity IV data set on which Samuels and Shugart base their study, but both of which experience numerous
periods of cohabitation. Samuels and Shugart classify Austria behaviourally as a ‘parliamentarized president-parliamentary regime’
(Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 106). They argue that, while constitutionally Austria has a president-parliamentary form of
semi-presidentialism, the president’s power, by convention, is so weak that ‘Austrian politics does not follow the formal
configuration of power its constitution outlines’ (Samuels and Shugart, 2010, p. 107). Their solution is to exclude Austria from
their list of cohabitations. (The same point applies to Ireland, even though formally it has a premier-presidential form of
semi-presidentialism). The same logic can certainly be applied to Iceland, where, for the same reason,‘it is customary ... to regard
the form of government as a parliamentary one’ (Kristinsson, 1999, p. 86). In this article, we are not concerned with comparing
parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. Therefore, rather than excluding Austria and Iceland,we reclassify both
countries as premier-presidential (i.e. as semi-presidential countries where, albeit by convention, the president does not dismiss the
government). This is consistent with the logic of Samuels and Shugart’s study.
8 In the original, Siaroff scores 1 for the direct election of the president.We omit this measure and recalculate the scores.We also
recalculate the score for Ireland, where, contrary to Siaroff ’s coding, the president does not have the right to veto legislation.
9 We calculate the Siaroff scores for those countries not included in his study.
10 Presidential power is usually operationalised as a continuous variable, but it can also be thought of as a categorical variable. Since
the distribution of the variable is somewhat skewed towards weaker presidents, we divided the data set into observations at or
below the median and above the median. Using this as a dummy variable in Model 5 produces similar results to the continuous
version, except that the premier-presidential indicator loses statistical significance. Inserting the presidential power dummy into
Model 6 reproduces essentially the same results.
11 São Tomé, with a Siaroff score of 7, experienced cohabitation after its 1996 presidential election.
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